Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Vern Frailey v. John C. McGarry : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Elias Hansen; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Frailey v. McGarry, No. 7312 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1084

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

l· <<~ ·

-•· .. !.. __ ' .;'

!\,Vi

.

),

Case No. 2506

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
/.

;

-

VERN FRAILEY,

'i..

~-

Plaintiff mnd Appellant,

)

vs.
JOHN C. McGARRY,

Defendant and Respondent.

......

BRIEF O·F APPELLANT

APPEALED FRO·M THE
FIFTH JUDICIAL D]S:TRICT CO·URT,
IN AND F.OR IRON .COUNTY, UTAH
WILL L. H.OYT, JUDGE

I
·
L
1.;."'
.i:'
·

-rr-:\

jt.:.J

DLIA:S HANSEN,

.

Atto,r ney f;or Plaintiff (JJIU],

1 1~~i :-·~
CLINE, -\Vr£s0~~-ciLINE,.~
~ r>r)

~~-~~lj~tbnd

.Ap~~1ellant

,

R·espondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page

ToPics
Statement of Case ......................................................................................

1

Assignments of Error.... ·-·········-···································------------------------------

10

Argument ....................................................................................................

13

The contract between plaintiff and defendant is against public
policy and therefore the court erred in striking the third
cause of action set out in the amended complaint........................

14

The plaintiff had a right to rescind the contract because the same
is against public policy ......................................................................

19

Under the decision of the trial court the defendant is rewarded
because of the fraud perpetrated upon the plaintiff____________________

20

The trial court erred in failing to decide all of the issues in this
cause and in undertaking to adjudicate the water right
application of Jerold E. Thompson..................................................

22

The trial court erred in granting the motion to strike the second
cause of action set out in plaintiff's amended complaint............

23

The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to strike the
fourth cause of action set out in plaintiff's amended complaint

26

The contract here involved was void from its inception in so far
as it deals with water rights because of the impossibility
of performance ....................................................................................

29

There was a partial if not a complete failure of consideration for
the money which plaintiff agreed to pay if and when a water
right was acquired ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

30

Both the conclusions of law and the judgment and decree are
without support in the evidence and likewise without support
in the findings of fact........................................................................

31

The plaintiff and not the defendant is entitled to the water
filings made by the plaintiff upon a rescission of the contract

35

The trial court erred in concluding that because plaintiff
breached the contract defendant is entitled to retain the
land, the money paid on the contract and the water
applications -----------------------------------------------------··························----------·

37

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-( Contirnued)
Page
STATUTES CITED

U. C. A. 1943, 100-3-8 .................................................................... 6, 13, 18
CASES CITED

Duchesne County vs. Humpherys, 106 Ut. 332, 148 Pac. {2) 338 ........ 17
Austin vs. Shipman, 160 Mo. App. 206; 141 S.W. 42'5 .......................... 26
Kneeland vs. Hetzel, 103 Okla. 3; 229 Pac. 218 .................................... 26
McChesney vs. Appek, 156 Min. 260; 194 N.W. 882 .............................. 26
McGarry vs. Thompson, 201 Pac. (2d) 288 ........................................ 32-37
Sawards et al vs. Meagher et al, 37 Utah 212; 108 Pac. 1112.............. 19
Sterlin~

vs. Gregory, 149 Cal. 117; 85 Pac. 305 .................................... 30

Simeon vs. Klinze, 66 Mont. 314; 213 Pac. 440 ...................................... 30
Williams vs. Butter, 58 Ind. App. 47; 105 N.E. 387; 107 N.E. 300........ 30
OTHER AuTHORITIES

12 Am. Jr., page 554, Sec. 64 .................................................................... 29
12 Am. Jr., page 1031, Sec. 451 ................................................................ 34
12 Am. Jr., page 1038, Sec. 455 ................................................................ 35
Black on Rescission, Vol. 2, page 844, Sec. 313, et. seq. and at
page 868, Sec. 322 ........... .... .... .. ......... .................................................. 20
Black on Rescission, 2nd. Sec. 159 ............................................................ 30
17 C.J.S. 22, et seq. .................................................................................... 18
17 C.J.S. 763 ................................................................................................. 19
17 C.J.S. Sec. 201, page 555-6 and Sec. 211, page 563 .......................... 19
17 C.J.S. Sec. 438, page 919 ...................................................................... 34
17 C.J.S. Sec. 274, page 660 ...................................................................... 19
17 C.J.S. Sec. 275, page 662 ...................................................................... 20
17 C.J.S. Sec. 279, page 668 ...................................................................... 20
17 C.J.S. Sec. 962, page 952 ...................................................................... 30
Page on Contracts, Vol. 5, page 4698, Sec. 2670 .................................... 29

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

VERN FRAILEY,

Plaintiff arnd Appellant,
Case No.
2506

vs.
JOHX C.

~IcGARRY,

Defendant and Respondent.

1

BRIEF O·F APPELLANT

STATEMENT O·F CASE
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant for the purpose of rescinding a contract entered
into by plaintiff and defendant on December 7, 1945
and to recover from the defendant the sum of $2,600.00,
which the plaintiff paid to the defendant in cash and
labor performed by the plaintiff for the defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The contract which plaintiff sought to have rescinded contains, among others, the following provisions:
"That the seller (defendant) for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and
convey to the buyer and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase
the following described real property, situate in
the County of Iron, State of Utah, to-wit:
'All of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, also
Northeast quarter of Southwest quarter and
Northwest quarter of Southeast quarter, all
being in Section 6, Township 36 South, Range
16 West S.L.M. and containing 960 acres
more or less, according to the official survey
thereof.'
''It is agreed that in the event the buyer or
any assignee shall make application to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate of
app-ropriation to appropriate 'vater or shall procure a certificate to appropriate water from
wells located upon the said premises and said
buyer or assignee or assignees shall thereafter
default in this contract, the seller shall immediately become the assignee of any such application or appropriation and the state engineer of the state of Utah is hereby authorized
to recognize said seller as the assignee of any
such a~pplication and in the event a certificate
of approp-riation has issued to the said buyer
the water right thereunder shall he considered
as appurtenant to the said premises and in the
event of default the title thereto shall immediately pass to the seller. The seller reserves
one-half of all mineral rights and oil rights
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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3
\vhich might be appurtenant to or belonging thPreto. ''
"Said buyer hereby agrees to enter into
possession and pay for said described prem.ises
the sum of T'venty Eight Thousand and Eight
Hundred and No/100 Dollars, payable at office
of John C. nicGarry, Cedar City, Utah, strictly
"~ithin the follo,ving tin1es to 'vit: Two Thousand
and Six Hundred and No/100 Dollars cash the
receipt of 'vhich is hereby acknowledged. The
remaining balance of $26,200.00 payable as follows, to-wit: On any and all lands '""here water
wells permits are granted and allowing water
for any given acreage, said acreage is to be tilled
and cropped. On or before January 1st being
termed the end of each harvest season said buyer
is to pay to said seller, the sum of Ten Dollars
per acre cash and in addition thereto five percent (5%) interest on all deferred payments on
each and every acre tilled and cropped until
the full purchase price, together with interest
has been paid. The above given $2,600.00 cash
payment receipted herein is to be credited on the
next :payment which becomes due and payable
on or before January 1, 1947.
"Said monthly payments to be applied first
to the payment of interest and second to the
reduction of the principal. Interest shall be
charged from this date on all unpaid portions
of the purchas·e price at the rate of five per cent
per annum, payable monthly.''
"In the event the Buyer shall default in the
payment of any sp~ecial or general taxes, assessments or insurance premiums as herein provided,
the seller may, at his option, pay said taxes,
assessments and insurance premiums or either
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of them, and if he elects so to do, then the Buyer
agrees to repay the seller upon demand all such
sums so advanced and paid by him, together
with interest thereon from date of payment of
said sums at the rate of 3A, of one per cent per
month until paid."
''The seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the times and in the manner above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the. title to the
a:bove described premises free and clear of all
encumbrances, except as herein mentioned and
except as may have accured by or through the
acts or neglect of the Buyer and to furnish at
his expense an abstract or a policy of title insurance at the option of the seller brought to
date at time of sale or at times of delivery of
deed at th~ option of Buyer."
''The Buyer and Seller each agree that
should they default in any of the covenants and
agreements contained herein to pay all costs and
exp!enses that may arise from enforcing this
agreement either by suit or otherwise including
a reasonable attorney's fee."
The contract is signed by defendant John C. !ieGarry, as seller, and plaintiff Vern Frailey, as buyer.

J. E. Thompson signed as a witness.
·There are numerous other provisions In the contract which are not quoted but we do not deem such
other provisions material to this controversy and therefore have omitted quoting such other provisions.
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A COP'Y of the contract is attached to the antPHdetl
complaint (R. 2-!) and the original contract 'vas received
in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A''.
The grounds upon '\Yhich the plaintiff seeks to have
the court rescind the contract as appears from the
anrrended conrrplaint are:
On the First Cause of Action it is in substance
alleged that the plaintiff was induced to enter into the
contract by the fraudulent representations of the defendant in that the defendant represented that: (a)
there was ample '\Vater available to properly i~rigate
the real property described in the contract; (b) that the
defendant falsely represented that he had a good title
to the pToperty; (c) that the contract is against public
policy as expressed in the provisions of U.C.A. 1943,
100-3-8 which provides that a filing of a water right
application must be made in good faith and not for
purposes of speculation or monopoly; (d) in that at
the time the contract was entered into the defendant
was a married man whose wife was a resident of the
State of Utah but that he did not inform the plaintiff
of said fact or have his wife join in the contract so that
she could be held to the performance thereof.
The Second Cause of Action is founded upon the
failure and refusal of the defendant to furnish the plaintiff with an

~bstract

of title to the property described in

the contract; notwithstanding a demand was made fo:r
such abstract.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The ·r;rhird Cause of Action is based upon the claim
that the contract is against the public policy of this
state and particularly U .C.A. 1943, 100-3-8 in that the
defendant by the contract is seeking to speculate in the
public waters of the state by attempting to sen land
which was of the market value of $1.50 per acre without water for $30.00 per acre if and when plaintiff
provides water for the land, and thereby defendant
attempted to secure a profit of $28.·50 p~er acre o~ 2000
per cent if and when water is received by the plaintiff
for irrigation of said land. 'That if the contract is held
valid it will result in an unco~scionable profit to the
defendant as a result of his speculating in the public
waters of the State of Utah without the defendant expending any Iabor or money .in developing or putting
to a beneficial use the public waters of the State of Utah.
In the Fourth Cause of Action it is alleged that the
contract which it is sought to rescind is so uncertain
as to render the same invalid in that it cannot be determined therefrom when, if ever, plaintiff is entitled
to a conveyance of the property described in the contract, nor can it be determined from said contract when,
if at all, the interest or the amount provided for in
such contract begins, or the amount of the purchase
price ; that is to say whether interest is payable from the
date of such contract or only on the amount that becomes due because some of the acreage of such land
is irrigated, tilled and cropped. That no consideration
whatsoever was given or agreed to 'be given by the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant for $26,200.00 of the amount provided for in
said contract and therefore sueh provision is invalid.
In each c.ause of action the plaintiff sought to recover $500.00 as attorney's fees for the prosecution of
the action. (R. 12 to 2-±)
To the amended complaint the defendant filed a
demurrer to each cause of action (R. 25) and a motion
to strike. (R. 27)
D·efendants motion to strike was granted and his
.. demurrer to the Second, Third and Fourth causes was
sustained but overruled as to the First Cause of Action.
(R. 29)
Thereafter the defendant filed an answer and crosscomplaint (counterclaim).
In the answer the defendant denied that any fraud
was perpetrated upon the plaintiff in the execution
of the contract. (R. 30 to 34) As a further affirmative
defense and as a cros·s complaint defendant seeks to
have declared forfeited any rights the p~aintiff may
have in the contract because of his having failed to pay
the taxes on the property described in the contract
and because he has failed to plant any crops or till any
of the land described in the contract notwithstanding
he has filed with the state engineer applications to appropriate water to irrigate such lands and at least one
of such applications has been granted by the state engineer, and because plaintiff has abandoned the contract. (R .. 34 and 36)
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To the answer and cross complaint the plaintiff
filed a reply and answer in which he admitted that he
had not paid the taxes on the premises described in
the contract. He alleged that he went to the attorney
for the defendant and through him made filings for
appropriation of a water right to irrigate the lands
described in the contract and denied generally the other
allegations of the answer and cross complaint. (R. 38
to 41)
Upon the issues thus raised by the amended complaint, the answer and cross -complaint of the defendant
and the reply and answer of the plaintiff a trial was
had. After the conclusion of the trial ~nd the filing
of briefs of counsel the court made and filed its menorandum of decision. (R. 62 to 68) In such memorandum
of decision the court found, among other things, that
the defendant had perpetrated fraud on the plaintiff
as to the availability of water to irrigate the lands
described in the contract; that the plaintiff had not
established the lack of good title in the defendant; that
the land described in the contract was of a value not
to exceed $1.50 .:per acre without water but with water
was of a value of $30.00 per acre. The court concluded
that if the plaintiff would transfer his own, and secure
a transfer of the filings to appropriate water held by
Thompson, then and in such case the defendant should
repay to the plaintiff the $2'600.00 paid on the contract
together with the money paid by plaintiff and Thon1pson
for filing fees, and together with legal interest thereon,
otherwise the defendant should retain the money paid
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to him by the plaintiff on the contrac.t and defendant
should also have decreed to hin1 all of the filings Inade
by plaintiff and Thon1pscn nnd retain the land described
in the contract free fron1 any and all claims of the plaintiff. The plaintiff "~as giYen ''fifteen days to give notice
to the court and to counsel for defendant as to w·hether
plaintiff and Thompson will transfer to defendant the
water application herein referred to and in case plaintiff_ does not so elect then counsel for plaintiff (defendant) may prepare and submit findings, conclusions
and decree disposing of the case in accordance herewith.'' The plaintiff gave no notice within the fifteen
days allowed, or at all, that he would make the transfer
of his water fillings or that he could secure the water
filings of Thompson whereupon the trial court made
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree.
(R. 70 to 79)
By its Judgement a.nd Decree the court held that
the contract of sale and purchase Plaintiff's Exhibit
''A'' was not subject to rescission hy the plain tiff and
that plaintiff take· nothing hy reason of his amended
complaint; that plaintiff has defaulted in and has
breached the said contract and the same is hereby declared to be forfeited and terminated and all rights of
the plaintiff in and to all of the property therein described are hereby declared to be lost, cancelled, forfeited and terminated.
It is from the judgement so made and entered that
plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ASSIGNMEN'TS OF ERROR
The plaintiff and appellant assigns the following
errors committed by the trial court upon which he relies
for a reversal of the judgement and decree appealed
from and for an order of this court directing the trial
court to enter a judgement and decree as prayed for
in plaintiff's amended complaint.
1. The trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion to strike and in sustaining defendant's demurrer
to the second cause of action set up in plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 29)
2. The trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion to strike and in sustaining defendant's demurrer
to the Third Cause of Action set out in plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 29)
3. The trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion to strike and in sustaining defendant's demurrer
to plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action (R. 29) set out
in plaintiff's amended complaint.
4. The trial court erred in striking paragraph 11
of plaintiff's first cause of action set out in plaintiff's
amended comp~laint. (R. 16)
5. :The trial court erred in striking paragraph 12
of plaintiff's first cause of action set out in plaintiff's
amended complaint.
6. The trial court erred in striking paragraph 17
of plaintiff's first cause of action as alleged in his
amended complaint. (R. 29)
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7. The trial court erred in Inaking its conelusion
of la"" numbered 2 wherein it is concluded: ~~That said
contract is not no"T subject to rescission because the
plaintiff has not offered to rescind said contract in its
entirety.'' That such conclusion is without support in
either the evidence or the Findings of Fact and especially is it at variance \Yith the allegations of plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 77)
8. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 3 and the whole thereof in that such
conclusion of law is without sup~port in either the evidence or the findings of fact and is contrary to law.
(R. 77)
9. The trial co~ erred in malting its fourth conclusion of law in concluding that plaintiff's failure to
till and crop any part of said premises, to drill any
wells on said premises for the irrigation thereof and
to make any further payments thereunder constituted
a breach of said contract. That such conclusion of
law is without support in either the evidence or the
findings of fact. (R. 77)
10. The trial court erred in making that part of
its fourth conclusion of law wherein it concluded that
"because of such default on the part of plaintiff the
defendant under his cross complaint is now entitled to
declare the same forfeited and terminated and all rights
of the plaintiff thereunder forfeited.'' That such conclusion of law is without support in either the evidence
or the findings of fact and is contrary to Law. (R. 77)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11. The trial court erred in its Judgement and
Decree wherein and whereby it adjudged and decreed
''That the contract entered into by defendant and plaintiff is not subject to a rescission by the plaintiff.''
and that plaintiff take nothing by reason of his amended
complaint. That said judgement is without support in
either the findings of fact or the evidence and is contary to law. (R. 79)
12. The trial court erred in making its judgement
and decree wherein it adjudged and decreed that all
rights of the plaintiff in and to all of the property
described in the complaint are declared to be lost, cancelled, forfeited and terminated, that such decree and
judgement is without support in either the evidence
or the findings of fact. (R. 79)
13. The trial court erred in that it failed to decide all of the issues raised at the trial of this cause
and particularly in that the decree and judgement does
not determine who is entitled to the water right 'applications which were filed by the .plaintiff and Thompson
in the office of the State Engineer. (R. 79)
14.

'The trial court erred in failing to find that

he, the plaintiff, had farming equipment in the State
of California which he would ship to Utah for use in
clearing and p-reparing for crops on any land that he
might purchase, as alleged in paragraph 4 of plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 13-14) and as established without conflict by the evidence. ( Tr. 10)
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15. The trial court erred in undertaking to adjudicate and in adjudicating the rights of Jerold E.
Thompson in and to the 'vater right applications uutde
by him in the office of the State Engineer notwith-*
standing he 'vas not a party to this action and the
court 'vas therefore 'vithout jurisdiction to adjudicate
such right.

16. The trial court erred in failing to grant ,plaintiff the relief prayed for in his amended complaint.
ARGUMENT
It will be noted that in his motion to strike the
defendant sought to have stricken the allegation relating to the contract between plaintiff and defendant
being against the public policy of this state and particularly those provisions thereof contained in U.C.A. 1943,
100-3-8 which in effect provide that the state engineer
shall not approve an application to app-ropriate water
when the same is filed for the purpose of speculation
or monopoly. (R. 15) The motion is at page 27 of the
judgement roll, paragraph 1 thereof. The trial court
granted the motion at the time it was argued but at the
beginning of the trial the court reversed its ruling and
reinstated the allegations theretofore stricken. ( Tr. 2.)
That being so we have not assigned such ruling as
error.
It will also be observed that the trial court found
that the defendant made the false representation alleged
in the amended complaint and that plaintiff in reliance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thereon entered into the contract between him and the
defendant. That being so we shall not at this time
review the evidence touching that phase of the case.
While the plaintiff takes the position that it having
been determined that the defendant was guilty of the
fraud alleged in the amended complaint it follows, as
a matter of 'law, that plaintiff is entitled to the relief
prayer still we shall in this, plaintiff's original brief,
argue the other assignments of error because even
though, if for any reason plaintiff is not entitled to the
relief p.rayed because of the fraud perpetrated upon
him, still he is entitled to prevail on the assigned errors
other than those touching the question of fraud.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDAN·T I:S AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
AND THEREFORE THE COURT ERRED IN
STRIKIN·G THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTIO·N
SET OUT IN THE AMENDED CO·MPLAIN'T
We have a law now in effect and in effect when
the contract here involved was entered into which in
part provides :
"It shall be the duty of the state engineer, upon
the payment of the approval fee to approve an
application if * * * * 4 The applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works
and the application was filed in good faith and
not for the purpose of speculation or monopoly.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That the defendant seeks to secure to hilnself an unconscionable profit out of the public waters of this
shtte is obvious. The evidence shows and the trial
court found that the land w·ithout water was at the
time complained of 'vorth $1.50 per acre and when water
is available for the irrigation of the land it is worth
$30.00 per acre. ( Tr. 122, R. 23)
The evidence further sho,vs that the plaintiff signed
a contract to purchase from defendant 160 acres of land
in the latter part of November or the first of December,
1945 and at that ~e plaintiff signed an application
to appropriate water for the 160 acres of land covered
by the contract and that he paid the filing fee. ( Tr. 8-9)
That application was assigned to defendant at the time
plaintiff and defendant entered into the contract here
involved. (Tr. 10) It will further he noted that the
defendant acquired the land described in the contract
on November 7, 1945. (R. 60) The price paid by defendant is not made to appear, except the deed to him
recites the sum of $10.00. 1\Ir. Edward H. Parry, who
purchased approximately 1880 acres of land, including
the land described in the contract, paid $1.50 per acre.
The sale was confirmed on October 9, 1945. (R. 56)
The documents a:bove referred to are found in the Judgement Roll and not among the exhibits.
Thus under the contract, if the same is construed
as the defendant contends it should be construed, he is
to receive a profit of $27,360.00 if and when the plaintiff, solely at his own expense, makes application to
appropriate water or procures a certificate to appropriate water from wells located upon the property
described in the contract. If such a contract does not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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constitute a speculation on behalf of the defendant in
the public waters of this state it is impossible to conceive of transactions which may be said to -constitute
speculation.
It is of course an elementary principle of law that
one may not do indirectly that which he may not do
directly. In this case the plaintiff and his brother-inlaw J. C. Thompson sought to secure from the State
Engineer the right to develop some of the public waters
for a beneficial purpose, namely: for the irrigation
of land. Under the contract, as defendant contends it
should he construed, the plaintiff is required to pay to
the defendant $27,360.00 for the privilege of exercising
a right which the plaintiff and Thompson seek to acquire from the State Engineer. If the defendant had
hin1self gone to the State Engineer and represented
that he desired to file on sufficient water to irrigate
the 960 acres of land which he in tended to sell or had
sold to the plaintiff under a contract whereby he, defendant, was to receive a profit of $28.50 per acre on
account of the water filing can there be any doubt that
under such circumstances it would have been the clear
duty of the state engineer to refuse such a request~
The scheme adopted by the defendant in the questioned
contract is at least as objectionable, if not more objectionable, :than the supposed case.
·Thus it will ibe seen that by the terms of the contract here in controversy the plaintiff does not obligate
himseif to apply for any water to irrigate the lands
described in the contract. If however .plaintiff shall
apply for or develop water then and in such event he
is required to pay homage to the defendant to the tune
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of $27,360.00, together "ith interest on any deft\rrPd
pay1nent at 5% per annum. l\IorPnYer by the contraet
here brought in question the defendant seeks to change
the la,vs of this state so that any application to appropriate 'vater made by the plaintiff shall be appurtenant
to the land described in· the contract, not,vithstanding
this eourt has held the la'v to be otherwise. Duchesn.e
Co1.tnty rs. Humpherys, 106 [Tt. 332, 1!8 Pa.c. (2) 338.
It would seem obvious that one of the purposes,
if not the sole purpose, of the legislature in condemning
speculation in the public ";aters of this state is to remove impediments that may stand in the way of the
development of the natural resources of the state. If
the public -waters of this state are to be the subject of
speculation and profits and enormous sums of money
are to be paid to persons who take no part in the development of such waters the inevitable result is to
retard development. The present controversy is an outstanding illustration of the results that follovv in the
wake of such a practice.
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff
entered into the contract with the defendant and came
to Utah from California with the intention to engage
in farming upon a somewhat large scale. When he
learned that it was at least very doubtful if he could
acquire sufficient water to irrigate the lands which he
had agreed to purchase and probably when he learned
of the further fact that he was being defrauded by the
defendant out of $27,360.00 for the right to use a water
right which the defendant did not own· it is no wonder
that plaintiff first hestitated and then concluded that
he should not and probably could not go through with
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his plan to develop the 960 acres of land which he undertook to purchase and develop. If the ·State of Utah
should approve a pr.ocedure calculated to enrich the
speculator and retard the development of its natural resources it is headed towards stagnation rather than
progression.
If the contract here involved is considered from a
different point of view its provsions are likewise against
public policy. There is a well recognized rule of law
that a contract in restraint of trade is against public
policy. 17 C.J.S. 22, et seq. The reason for such doctrine is that people should be encouraged to be productive and not inactive. The contract between plaintiff and
defendant is calculated to discourage the plaintiff from
developing water to irrigate the land covered by the contract, that is to say if he developed water he must pay
to the defendant the additional sum of $26,200.00 for
the privilege of doing so. If he chooses not to apply
for a water right to irrigate and develop the property
described in the contract he is free to do so without incurring any additional obligation.
So far as we have been able to find this court has
not passed upon a contract involving the construction
of the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 100-3-8, which have
heretofore been quoted. There is a somewhat early case
in this jurisdiction which was decided before the enactment of the foregoing statute which seems to hold that
independent of statute it is against the public policy of
this state for one to sp·eculate in its public waters. See
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Sawards, et al vs. Meagher, .et a.l, 37 Uta,h 212, at page
222; 108 Pac. 1112 at page 1116.
The law, however, is "~ell and uniformly established
that a contract 'vhich is against public policy will not
receive the sanction of the courts. 17 C.J.S. 763, et seq.
and cases cited in the footnotes.
THE PLAINTIFF HAD A RIGHT TO RESCIND
THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THE 'SAME IS
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
It is alleged in the amended complanit that at and
prior to the time he entered into the contract, Exhibit
"A'', the plaintiff was not familiar with the practices
and customs prevailing in the state of Utah with respect
to the manner and procedure for acquiring a right to
use underground water. (Paragraph 5, page 3 of the
Judgment Roll). He so testified at the trial. Such allegation is by reference made a part of plaintiff's Third
Cause of Action. (R. 20)
While the cases generally hold that where a contract
is illegal the courts refuse to grant either of the parties
relief. Such rule has no application where the parties
are not in pari delecto. 17 C.J.S. Sec. 201, ·page 555-6 and
Sec. 211, page '563.
For a discussion of the law touching the relief
afforded to a party to a contract not equally at fault
with the other party where public policy will be advanced.
See 17 C.J.S., page 660, Sec. 274. That is especially ·so
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where the illegal purpose is not consummated. 17 C.J ..S.,
p~age ·662, Sec. 275. There are numerous cases cited in
the footnotes which sustain the text. The law announced
in the text is so well and uniformly established that we
shall not burden the court with a review of the cases.
Moreover such contracts may not he ratified. Nor does
the doctrine of waiver or estoppel apply to such contracts, especially where they contravene public policy.
See 17 C.J.S., Sec. 279, page 668 and cases cited in the
footnotes.
The law will also be found discussed at some length
in Black 'On Rescission, Vol. 2, ~page 844, 8 ec. 313, et seq.
OJYI)d ~at 'P!age 868, 8 ec. 322.
It will be noted that the plaintiff in this case was
in no sense guilty of speculating in the public waters of
this state. Under the decision rendered by the trial
court that is the sole prerogative of the defendant.

UNDER 'THE DECISION ·OF THE 'TRIAL COURT
THE DEFENDANT IS REWARDED BECAUSE
OF THE FRAUD PERPETRATED UPO·N
THE PLAINTIFF
It is of course the uniform purpose of law and of
equity to prevent one guilty of fraud from reaping the
p,rofits of his fraudulent acts. Under the decision of the
trial court the defendant is not only given all of the
profits that he could hope to realize if the contract had
been free from fraud or other objections hut in addition
thereto the court apparently awarded the defendant the
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applications to appropriate "'ater filed by J t:'rold E.
Thompson, the brother-in-la"' of the plaintiff, not"'"ithstanding there is nothing in the contrnrt "·hich provides
that he is entitled thereto and notw·ithstanding Jerold
E. Thompson was not a party to the contrart. It will
be noted that the contract proYides that ''in the event
the buyer or an~~ assignee shall make application to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate to appropriate "\Yater from wells located upon the said premises
and said buyer, as assignee, or assignees, shall thereafter default in this contract the seller shall immediately
become the assignee of any such application * * *.''
Jerold E. Thompson is not and never has been the assignee of the plaintiff of the applications made hy
Thompson to appropriate water. Not only that but
Thompson was never a party to this proceeding. Notwithstanding such being the state of the record it was
apparently the intention of the trial court to award to
the defendant the water filings made hy Thompson. We
say apparently because of the provisions of the last
paragraph of the judgment and decree wherein it is
provided that the plaintiff has defaulted in and has
breached the said contract, and the same is hereby declared to be forfeited and terminated and all rights of
the plaintiff in and to all of the property therein described are declared to be lost, cancelled, forfeited and
terminated.

By such provision the trial court may or

1nay not have assumed that the water filings made by

Thompson belongs to Frailey. If the court assumed
that such filings belonged to Frailey such assumption is
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wholly without support in the evidence. If the trial court
did not so assume it was none the less error for the court
to fail to find and decree that the same did not belong to
plaintiff but belonged to ·Thompson. It is, of course,
one of the cardinal principles of law that when a court
of equity takes jurisdiction of a cause it is required to
dispose of all questions presented to the end that every
·controversy is disposed of.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECIDE ALL .O·F THE IS·SUES IN THIS CAUSE
AND IN UNDERTAKING T·O ADJUDICATE
THE WATER RIGH·T APPLICATION
OF JEROL.D E. THOMPSON
By assignments numbered 13 and 15 plaintiff attacks the last paragraph of the judgment and decree
(R. 79) wherein it is decreed that all rights of the plaintiff are forefeited in and to all of the property described
in the contract. It is by no means clear just what is
meant by the judgment. It will be noted that no water
right applications are described in the contract. Certainly the water right applications of Thompson are not,
therein described and as we have pointed out under the
preceding heading such water ·right is not even referred
to in the contract, because Thompson is not an assignee
of plaintiff hut on the contrary he is the original applicant for a water right. Moreover it may be open to
serious doubt if the water filings are property, but even
if they are they are not described in the contract. Thus
it is plaintiff's position that the decree is so vague and
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uncertain as to be at least voidable if not absolutely void,
and as we have heretofore pointed out if the decree and
judgment is not vulnerable to attack because of it~ uneertainlY it is none the le~s 'Yithout support in the evi"'
dence and is contrary to law.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING TIIE
~IOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION SET OUT IN PLAINTIFF''S AMENDED COMPLAINT
The trial court granted defendant's motion to strike
the Second Cause of Action set out in plaintiff's amended
complaint. (R. 18, 27, 29)

Plaintiff has assigned such

ruling as error. The contract between plaintiff and defendant contains this provision:
"The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the times and in the
manner above mentioned agrees to execute and
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances, except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued by or through the acts
or neglect of the Buyer, :(JJJ'td tlo fw.nish ·at his
expense an ·abstract or a policy of t?;t:le insu!fiance
at the option ·of the seller brought to date ~at the
time of sale Of" at time -of delJivery of ·deie.d at the
option of the Buyer.'? (Italics supplied.)
At the time of the argument of the motion to strike
the trial court took the view that the defendant was under
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no obligation to furnish an abstract of title or a policy
of title insurance until he was paid for the property in
full. As we read the provisions of the contract above
quoted they are not subject to such a construction. The
seller agreed to do two things. To furnish an abstract of
title or a policy of title insurance at the option of the
seller brought to date at time of sale or at time of the
delivery of the deed at the option of the buyer (the
plaintiff) and to execute and deliver a deed conveying
a good title to the buyer.
It will be noted that the form of contract used by the
parties to the contract here involved was a uniform sales
contract which is in general use in Utah. N otwithstanding that form of contract has been in general use in Utah
for a number of years, this is the first time that the
writer of this brief has learned of anyone placing the
construction on the contract that was given it by the
trial court. Moreover the language above quoted gives
the buyer the option to require an abstract or policy of
insurance brought to date at time of sale or at time of
delivery of the deed. If the seller, defendant, is not obligated to furnish an abstract until he receives all of his
money and delivers a deed there would be no sense in
the buyer having an abstract or policy of title insurance
as of the time of sale. O·bviously an abstract of title or
policy of title insurance as of the time of delivery of
deed would be effective as of the time of sale. Moreover
the purpose of the buyer being entitled to an abstract or
policy of title insurance was to furnish the buyer protection against the contingency that the seller might receive
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all or substantiallY
. all of his monev. and then be unable
to convey title, with the result that the buyer n1ay have
parted \Yith his money \Yithout being ablt> to recover the
same or the premises. ..~..\. construction of the eontraet
such as that given by the trial rourt is "rithout support
in the language of the contract as \Yell as at variance \Vith
the common practice of those \Yho engag-e in transactions
for the sale and purchase of real estate \Yhere the payments are extended over a substantial period of time.
In connection \Yith what we have said touching the
striking of the Second Cause of Action the attention of
the court is directed to the allegation contained in paragraph 12 of plaintiff's First Cause of Action, which was
striken by the trial court and \vhich we have assigned
as error in assignment 5.
If the defendant had furnished an abstract or policy
of title insurance plaintiff could have ascertained if
the wife of the defendant had conveyed to him her inchoate interest in the property or that she become obligated to join in the conveyance when the money was paid
for the property. The outstanding inchoate interest of
defendant's wife is of course a cloud upon his title.
The sole purpose of the provision in the contract
requiring the seller to furnish the ~buyer an abstract or
policy of title insurance at the time of sale was to enable the buyer to protect himself against the possibility
that he might pay for the property and then when the
time for conveyance arrives he unable to secure title
to the purchased property.
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The following cases support the proposition that if
a seller who has agreed to furnish an abstract or policy
of title insurance fails and refuses to do so the buyer
may rescind the contract of purchase and recover any
money that he may have paid on the -contract:
Austin vs. Shipmatn, 160 Mo. App. 206; 141 ·S.W. 425
McChesney vs. Appek, 15·6 Min. 260; 194 N.W. 882
K ne:eZarnd vs. H etz.el, 103 Okla. 3; 229 Pac. 218.

THE TRIAL COURT ERR.ED IN GRANTING D-EFENDANT'S MOTION TO 'STRIKE THE
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTI·ON SET
O·UT IN PLAINTIFF '·S
AMENDED COMPLAINT.
Heretofore in this brief we have discussed the contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", on the assumption that
such contract is sufficiently definite and certain to enable
the court to ascertain what was the intention of the
parties when such contract was entered into. It was
apparently on the assumption that the terms of the contract were sufficiently certain to enable the court to ascertain what the parties intended that the trial court
sustained the demurrer and granted the motion to
strike the Fourth Cause of Action set out in plaintiff's
amended complaint. (R. 29)
By our argument touching the various other reasons why the judgment of the court below should be revers.ed we do not wish to be understood as conceding
that the contract is sufficiently certain to enable a court
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to ascertain what was tl1e intention of the parties thereto
and to give effeet to such intention.
We have already :pointed out that there is nothing
in the contract "Thereby the plaintiff obligates hhnself
to apply for any water to irrigate the lands described
in the contract. In the event the plaintiff should not apply for a water right there is nothing in the contract
which indicates what shall be the rights of the parties
or when, if at all, plaintiff is entitled to. a conveyance of
the premises. If plaintiff should fail to apply for a
water right is the $2600.00 paid on the contract to be in
full payment for the land~ If not is the plaintiff required
to pay more or less than $2600.00, if so, how much more
or less~ There is no language in the contract from which
the court can find any answer to these questions. The
contract provides that ''on any and all lands where water
well permits are granted and allowing water for any
given acreage said acreage is to he tilled and cropped.''
Suppose permits are granted and water is allowed but
no water is actually developed must such lands nevertheless be tilled and cropped~ To give effect to such
language according to its meaning would require the
plaintiff to till and crop land even though no water is
or can be developed. Can it be that such was the intention of the parties to the contract~ We don't know
and it is impossible for anyone to ascertain from the
language used when viewed in the light of the purposes
of the contract. Just what function the language ''on or
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vest season serves in the contract we are at a loss to
ascertain.
The contract then provides that "said buyer is to
pay said seller the sum of Ten Dollars per acre cash and
in addition thereto five percent (5%) interest on all deferred payments in cash and every acre tilled and
cropped. Until the full purchase price, together with
interest has been paid.'' Supposing that no land is tilled
or cropped what then~ No one can tell. Is the five percent interest provided for in the contract to be paid only
on each and every acre tilled and cropped or is the 5%
interest payable on the whole $28,800.00~ No one can
tell from the language of the contract. The language
just quoted indicates that the 5% interest is payable
only on the land that is tilled and cropped and upon
which there is a deferred payment. How frequently is
the $10.00 per acre to be paid on the land tilled and
cropped~

No one can tell from the language used in the

contract. Contrary to the provision of the contract above
quoted it is provided that monthly payments shall be
made and interest from this date at 5% per annum.
What was the agreement of the parties with respect to
payments that were provided for in the typewritten portion of the contract just quoted and the provision in the
printed portion of the contract immediately
Again no one ean tell.

following~

If the language of a purported contract is so vague
and uncertain that the courts cannot ascertain therefrom
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"That is intended the court 'Yill declare the sa1ne void.
12 _ A_nl. Jnr., page 554, Sec. 6-± and cases there cited.

THE CONTRACT HERE IN\"'"()L\'"ED W A:S \ 70ID
FROM ITS INCEPTION IN SO FAR A'S IT
DEALS \v"'ITH \v.,._A_TER RIGHTS BECAUSE OF THE I)lPOSSIBILITY
OF PERFORl\1ANCE.
The authorities teach that when a contract is impossible of performance at the time of its execution it
is invalid. Page on ·Cont!f'iacts, 17 ol. 5, page 4698, Sec.
2670, and cases there cited.
It is alleged in the First Cause of Action and the
trial court found that there was not sufficient water
available to irrigate the lands described in the agreement
between plaintiff and defendant. (See paragraphs 7 and
8 of the amended -complaint. R. 14 and paragraph 9 of
the Findings of Fact. R. 72) It is also alleged and found
that the plaintiff believed that there was sufficient water
to irrigate the lands described in the contract and that
he would not have entered into the contract if he had
known that there was not sufficient water to irrigate
such premises. (Paragraph 9 of the amended complaint.
R. 15 and paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact. R. 73)
Thus the plaintiff did not assume the risk of there being
an insufficient supply of water when he entered into
the contract and therefor the same is invalid because
of the impossibility of performance or mistake of fact.
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titled to rescind the contract, or more accurately there
was no contract. 17 ·C·.J.S. ~S'ec. 962, page 952 and cases
there cited.

THERE W .NS A PARTIAL IF NOT A COMPLE·TE
F AILUR.E O·F C~ONSIDERATION FOR THE
MONEY WHICH PLAINTIFF AGREED TO
PAYIFANDWHEN A WATERRIGHT
WAS ACQUIRED.
The general rule is that a failure or even a partial
failure of consideration will justify the rescission or
cancellation of an obligation in equity. 1 Black on Rescission, 2 Ed., Sect. 159; Sterling vs. Gr.eg;ory, 149 Cal.
117; 85 Pac. 305; Sinteon vs. Klirnze, 66 Mont. 314; 213
Pac. 440; Willi.an~s vs. Butter, 58 Ind. App. 47; 105 N.E.
387; 107 N.E. 300.
While in this case the defendant did not agree that
plaintiff should receive a vvater right, or for that matter
make any agreement with respect to ~ water right other
than to require the payment of an unconscionable sum
of money by the plaintiff if he should ch?ose to develop
a water right. The defendant certainly acquired no
greater right to have the contract enforced because of the
complete or partial failure of considHration received by
plaintiff because the consideration was to come from the
public resources of the state rather than from some
right possessed by the defendant. It will be noted that
the plaintiff in his fourth cause of action, paragraph 3c,
(R. 22) alleges that defendant gave no consideration for
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the $26,200 which "'"as to be paid if and 'vhen n "~ater
right was acquired for the pre1nises dr·seribed in t hP eontract. As heretofore pointed out that cause of action
,vas ordered stricken and such order is assigned as error.

''r

BOTH THE CONCLUSIONS OF LA
AND THE
JUDG~IE~T AND DECR,EE ~\RE 'VITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE E\~DENCE AND LIKEWISE
WITHO·lTT SUPPORT IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT.
In its Memorandum of Decision the court found that
the defendant was guilty of the fraud charged in the
amended complaint. Notwithstanding such findings the
court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to partially rescind the contract, that is to a return of the
money which he had paid on the contract, if within fifteen days he and Thompson should assign to the defendant all of the water filings which they paid for and
filed in the office of the State Engineer. (R. 68)
In order to fully appreciate the injustice to the plaintiff of the requirement that he and Thompson assign
to the defendant their water filings before plaintiff could
secure even a partial relief because of the fraud perpetrated upon him by the defendant it is necessary to
keep in mind the facts and circumstances surrounding
the execution of the contract between plaintiff and defendant.
At and prior to the time the contract was entered
into the plaintiff was a resident of Tula Lake, California,
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where he was engaged in farming and where he was the
owner of farming equipment which enabled him to engage in farming on a large scale. Plaintiff made it
known to the defendant that if he, plaintiff, purchased
land from the defendant that he, plaintiff, would move
his farming equipment to Utah for the purpose of operating irrigated farming lands on a somewhat large scale.
(Tr. '9-10-16 and 103)
After plaintiff had learned from the state engineer
that his water right applications would probably not be
approved and after the defendant had refused to furnish
plaintiff an abstract of title, the plaintiff, upon· advice
of the state engineer, purchased 640 acres of land from
the state and sought to have the applications to appropriate water theretofore applied for use on the lands
which he contracted to purchase from defendant to the
lands purchased from the state. (Tr. 17) It should also
be noted that J. E. Thompson was not a party to the
contract although he signed as a witness thereto.
We have already pointed out that there is no provision in the contract which give·s the defendant any
claim to the filing made by Thomps~n. It is reasonable
to assume that Thompson would not consent to assign
his filings to defendant.
This court may take judicial notice of its own deci~
sion. It appears from the decision of this court in the
case of McGa;rry vs. Thompson, 201 Pac. (2d) 288
that Thompson, who was a party to that case and
who is the same person as the Thompson who n1ade
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the filings here inYolYed, \Yas and is in dPs pt_\ rn t e
need of a w·ater filing to apply on land8 \rhieh he has
acquired fron1 the state. That being so to grant plaintiff the right to a return of the nlon~_:}y paid b~· hiin
to defendant on condition that plaintiff surrender to defendant the "\Yater filings amounts to sheer mockery. The
only chance that plaintiff has to succeed in his farming
venture is to secure a water right. The water filings that
plaintiff has made "\Yill probably not be what McGarry
represented them to be but if plaintiff is permitted to retain them that is the best he can get out of a poor bargain. It should be kept in mind that the position in
\vhich plaintiff now finds himself is due solely to the
fraud of the defendant.
If the case is viewed from the position of the defendant what principles of law or equity entitles him
to retain all of the profits of his fraudulent acts~ Why
should he be entitled to retain not only the land covered
by the contract and the $2600.00 which he fraudulently
secured but also have conveyed to him the water filings
which were paid for iby Frailey and Thompson~ Of
course if he is permitted to do that then and in such
case fraud pays very handsomely. Not only that but
the law prohibiting speculating in the public waters of
this state becomes a myth and the defendant is at liberty
to again perpetrate a fraud by selling the water right
at an enormous price upon some unsu.sp·ecting person
who might desire to develop the natural resources of the
state. If he succeeds in doing that he may, as in this
case, retain any down payment that he may receive and
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then proceed to repeat his fraudulent practices without
end, all to his own enrichment and the retardation of the
development of the ·state.
The law is so well and uniformly settled to the effect
that when a contract is rescinded the parties are to be
placed in status quo that we shall cite only a few of the
many authorities which so hold.
''The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be restored on both sides. Releasing one ·party from
his part of the agreement and excusing him from
making the other party whole do not seem agreeable to reason or justice. Hence the general rule
is that a party who wishes to rescind an agreerunt must place the opposite party in statu quo.''
12 Am. Jur., page 1031, Sec. 451.
Numerous cases will he found in the foot notes to
the text which support the same. To the same effect 17
C.J.S., page 919, ·Sec. 438, et seq, and cases there cited

in foot notes.
In this case the plaintiff by his amended complaint
''offered to do equity in the premises and to cancel and
return to the defendant his duplicate original of the
contract above mentioned upon the receipt by the plaintiff of the consideration which he, the plaintiff, has paid
to the defendant as hereinbefore alleged.'' All that the
plaintiff received from the defendant was the contract
of purchase which as ohove indicated he offered to cancel.
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THE PLAINTIFF AND NOT THE DEFENDANT IS
ENTITLED TO THE \V-ATER FILINGS MADE
BY THE PL-AINTIFF UPON A RECISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
''Generally speaking the effect of re~rission
is to extinguish the contract. The e.ontract is annihilated so effectuallY that in conten1plation of
law it has never had ~nY existence even for the
purpose of being broken.· . A.ceordingly it has been
said that a la·wful rescission of an agreement puts
an end to it for all purposes, not only to preclude
the recovery of the contract price but also to prevent the recovery of damages for breach of the
contract. The effect of a rescission of an agreement is to put the ·parties back in the same position they were in prior to the making of the contract * * * The party rescinding may, however,
have a right to restitution with respect to any
performance on his part." 12 Am. Ju.r. 1038, Sec.
455, and cases cited in the foot notes.
We have heretofore in this brief directed the attention of the court to the memorandum of opinion of
the trial court wherein it found that plaintiff was entitled- to rescind the contract because of fraud but then
said that in order to exercise the right plaintiff must assign his water filings and secure an . assignment of
Thompson's water filings to defendant before he could
exercise such right. To make the right of the plaintiff
to rescind the contract conditioned upon the assignment
of plaintiff's and Thompson's water filings to the defendant is directly at variance with the very essence
of the doctrine of rescission. Independent of the con tract
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the defendant was wholly without even a color of right
to the water applications. Such applications were made
and paid for by the plaintiff and Thompson. In order
to give the defendant any semblance of a claim to the
water applications he must look to the contract. }\foreover as we have heretofore pointed out if the contract
be looked at it is made crystal clear that the defendant
is, by the con tract, illegaily speculating on a large scale
in the public waters of this state.
In its conclusions of law No. 2, page 77, the court
concludes that said contract is not now subject to rescission because the plaintiff has not offered to rescind
said contract in its entirety but demands a return of the
down payment and cancellation of the contract, and asserts the right to retain all of the said water filings and
applications. A similar thought is expressed in paragraph 3 of the conclusions of law. (R,. 77 and in the first
paragraph of the judgment and decree R. 79) We have
assigned as error such conclusion of law and part of the
judgment and decree in assignments numbered 7, 8, 11.
The trial court having concluded that plaintiff was
entitled to rescind the contract the defendant may not
be heard to say that plaintiff must assign his own water
applications and secure the assignment of Thompson's
water applications to the defendant. The defendant
never had any right to the water applications at or prior
to the time the contract was entered into nor is the plaintiff hy the contract obligated to make any water filing
or applications, much less did the defendant at the ti1ne
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the contract "\Yas entered into or at all acquire any elaim
to the filings made by Thon1pson.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CO·NCLUDIN(J
THAT BEC.A.USE PL.AINTIFF BREACHED THE
CONTR_A_CT DEFEND.A.NT IS ENTITLED TO
RETAIN THE L_.:\_ND, THE 1\IONEY PAID
ON THE CONTRACT AND THE
WATER APPLICATIONS.

In paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law (R. 77)
and in the second paragraph of the Decree and Judgment the trial court concluded and decreed that the
plaintiff had forfeited all of his rights in the property
mentioned in the contract because he had ibreached the
contract. We have attacked such conclusion and part of
the judgment by assignments numbered 9 and 10.
In light of the court's finding that water was not
available to satisfy the water applications it would seem
a useless thing for the plaintiff to drill wells and plant
crops if there is no water available. While there does
not seem to be any evidence in the record touching the
cost of drilling a well it does appear in the case of M cGarry vs. Thompson, 201 Pac. (2d) 288, 29'1, that the
cost of drilling a well was $1975.00. It would indeed
be a reckless undertaking to drill wells at a cost of
nearly $2000.00 each when to do so would result in
a failure to secure a permanent water supply and when
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an attempt to drill a well may obligate the plaintiff
to pay to defendant an additional $26,200.00 without
regard to whether the well proved to be a success or a
failure.
Moreover, under the view taken by the trial court
the plaintiff had a right to rescind the contract but because he sought the aid of the court in accomplishing
his right he, the plaintiff, not only lost such right but was
deprived of rights in his water filings and to the money
he paid on the contract. Moreover, if the plaintiff had
proceeded to perform the contract he would doubtless
have been confronted with the claim that he had waived
his right to a rescission because of the fraud perpetrated
upon him.
If the plaintiff is entitled to rescind the contract it
follows as a matter of law that he is entitled to be placed
in statu quo, that is to a return of the money paid on the
contract and to retain the water applications which he
paid for. As we have heretofore pointed out if plaintiff
is dep-rived of the water filing he will be unable to pursue
his farming venture in the Byrl district, if indeed he
will ;be able to do so if he is permitted to retain the water
filing.
If the contract is rescinded and the defendant is
given hack his land he will be in the same position that
he was in when the contract was executed. Defendant
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did not at the time the contract was entered into have
any interest in the "Tater filings, nor did he under the
terms of the contrart acquire any right to rt\quire the
plaintiff to make any such filings. His claimed right
comes, if at all, because the plaintiff made the filings after
the contract \Yas executed. lTnder such a state of faets
the doctrine of rescission is fully complied with by the
plaintiff when the real estate described in the contract
is returned to the defendant and the plaintiff is paid
back the money, together "ith legal interest thereon and
plaintiff is allowed to retain his water filings.

In the foregoing brief we have attacked the contract upon various grounds other than the fact that defendant perpetrated fraud upon the plaintiff in securing
the same. We have so attacked the contract because if
the same is void for the reasons discussed it is incapable
of being ratified. Moreover if the contract is void neither
of the parties acquired any right thereunder. Under
· such an instrument the defendant could not acquire any
right to the water filings nor the money paid to him. If
for example a contract is against public policy the same
principles of public policy that condemns the contract
likewise condemns an attempt to ratify the same and precludes the defendant from securing any rights thereunder.
It may be that the defendant will attack the trial
court's finding touching the question of fraud and further
claim that the plaintiff waived the fraud. Such were
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defendant's contentions before the trial court. Until
we are advised of defendant's position in such respects
we shall not discuss such matter but reserve our discussion thereof for a reply brief.
It is submitted that plaintiff should he granted the
relief prayed for in his amended complaint and that he
be awarded his cost on this appeal.
~espectfully

submitted,

ELIAS HAN:8EN
Attorney for Appellant
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